In this paper, we show that incomplete markets both across and within countries lead to trade imbalances. We use a two-period general equilibrium model with countries composed of heterogenous households and characterize the trade balance when markets are incomplete. We then consider a world composed of countries that engage in balanced trade when markets are complete or when there are no risky assets. When markets are incomplete, trade imbalances emerge. Market incompleteness across countries causes trade imbalances because national income in some countries is more sensitive to risky asset payoffs than in others. Market incompleteness within countries causes trade imbalances because superior risk sharing in one country leads to a lower precautionary demand for saving. JEL Classification Numbers: D52, F30 * This paper encompasses and supercedes my earlier paper "The effect of financial sophistication on the trade balance." Helpful comments and suggestions from Bill Brainard, Doug Irwin and Ken Rogoff are greatly appreciated. John Geanakoplos invested a lot of time and energy in this project for which I am eternally grateful. Thanks to students in the graduate international finance class at Princeton in the Spring of 2000 for patiently sitting through a draft of this paper.
Introduction
In this paper, we show that incomplete markets both across and within countries lead to trade imbalances. We work in the context of a one-good, two-period general equilibrium model. Countries are composed of a collection of individual households each of which receives stochastic income. Households can invest in a riskless asset and in risky assets but, in general, assets do not span income so markets are incomplete. In most cases, we assume that all households trade the same set of risky assets, but we also explore the possibility that households in one country only have access to a subset of the risky assets traded in another.
In such a world, markets may be incomplete within countries or across countries or both. To be precise, markets are incomplete across countries if national income is not spanned by risky assets. Markets are incomplete within a country if if the equilibrium allocation in autarky is different from the complete markets allocation. We explore both types of market incompleteness.
Market incompleteness across countries leads to trade imbalances. For a small open economy, the more highly correlated national income is with internationally traded risky assets, the lower the trade deficit. The intuition is straightforward. The more highly correlated national income is with risky assets, the more a country can hedge national income risk. But reduced risk also means reduced return, so households reduce consumption, which reduces the trade deficit.
Market incompleteness within countries affects the trade balance as well. The logic is that more complete markets lead to better risk-sharing; better risk-sharing results in a lower demand for precautionary savings; lower demand for precautionary saving leads to higher consumption in period zero and thus a higher trade deficit in period zero and a smaller deficit (or larger surplus) in period one.
The paper also makes some contributions to the theory of incomplete markets and to the theory of international trade in financial assets. First, in Section 3, we extend Svensson's (1988) laws of comparative advantage for international trade in assets to economies with heterogenous agents. Second, in Section 4, we show that the R 2 of a regression provides a useful measure of market incompleteness both for countries and for individuals. The remainder of the introduction consists of a brief literature review. Then, Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 defines and proves laws of comparative advantage for risky and riskless assets. Section 4 characterizes the trade deficit. Section 5 provides some concluding thoughts.
Literature review
This paper draws on both the literature on international finance and the literature on incomplete markets. This paper builds on work on international trade in financial assets. Svensson (1988) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) prove laws of comparative advantage for trade in assets for representative agent economies. In Section 3, we extend these results to heterogenous agent economies with incomplete markets. Losq (1985, 1989 ) use a model with exponential utility and normal returns to explore questions about market segmentation. Their model differs from ours in that households only consume in period one and all income risks are spanned by risky assets. Adler and Dumas (1983) provides a classic survey of issues in portfolio choice and asset pricing in an international context. Many other authors have used market incompleteness to explain the joint dynamics of consumption and income (see Baxter and Crucini (1995) and Kehoe and Perri (2002) , for examples) but the level not the dynamics of consumption and income are the focus of this paper.
The results in this paper also extend work in the incomplete markets literature (see Geanakoplos (1990) for an introduction). Demange and Laroque (1995) lay out the basic model used in the paper and prove some fundamental results about risksharing. Willen (2002) looks at the effects of new financial markets on consumption and welfare. Allowing trade in a risky asset amounts to opening a new market for the country or countries in question so some of the results in this paper bear a resemblance to results in that paper. Elul (1997) proved that addition of a new financial market always reduces the price of the riskless asset in an incomplete markets in an exponential-normal model, a result that plays a key role in Section 4.2.
Gertler and Rogoff (1990) prove a related result. They consider a rich and poor country with firms that face moral hazard problems in borrowing. They show that if rich country borrowers can self-finance more easily, then the moral hazard problem is smaller and capital will flow from the poor country to the rich country creating trade imbalances.
Basic model
The model is a standard two period exponential-normal general equilibrium with incomplete markets model (see Demange and Laroque (1995) and Willen (2002) for more on these models). The assumptions of exponential utility (Condition 1) and normally distributed endowments and asset payoffs (Condition 2) allow us to solve the model analytically. Such models are common in the literature and the shortcomings are well-known. In our case, the main shortcoming is that exponential utility implies that absolute tolerance for risk is unaffected by the level or variance of consumption. When a country goes from autarky to international trade, both the level and the variance of consumption change, but, by assumption, the country's appetite for risk remains the same.
Description of the economy
There is one consumption good. There are 2 periods, t = 0, 1. There are H households in the world, h = 1, ..., H. There are G countries, g = 1, ..., G. A country is a collection of household h ∈ g. 1 A consumption path is a random vector
. All agents have time-additive, separable, von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. Our first important condition is exponential utility.
2 . 
Condition 1 All agents have exponential utility. I.e.
the coefficient of global absolute risk aversion, one can still get simple formulas. However, the consumption formulae and the behavior of the economy with innovations are no longer so simple.
Condition 2 Asset payoffs and endowments are distributed jointly normally
The covariance of asset returns and income shocks β is a key ingredient in the analysis that follows. Let β h , β g and β be the J-dimensional vectors of covariances of household income for household h, average household income for residents of country g average household income for the entire world, respectively. We allow individuals to trade some country-specific subset J g of the assets. Agents, thus, choose a J g -dimensional portfolio of risky assets ω h and invest ω h 0 in the riskless asset. We assume that individuals have no endowments of securities. There are no limits on ω, unlimited short sales are possible.
3 Consider a perfectly competitive economy in which the consumption goods prices are normalized to be one and the price of the riskless asset is denoted by π 0 and risky asset prices are denoted by π ∈ R J .
Country level security holdings are ω g 0 = h∈g ω h 0 and ω g = h∈g ω h . Note that these are not averages but total holdings. The budget set is 
Trade in assets
In this section, we calculate a country's trade balance for assets. We show that we can analyze international trade in assets using a comparative advantage type argument. Specifically, Proposition 1 shows that if the autarky price for country g of a risky asset j exceeds the world price, then country g imports risky asset j; and the more the autarky excess return exceeds the world price, the more country g imports risky asset j. Proposition 2 shows that all else equal, the higher the autarky price of the riskless asset, the more a country imports the riskless asset -i.e. the more a country saves.
Before we go on, we introduce one more piece of notation. It will often be convenient to measure the price of an asset as the excess return over the riskless return. So we will often use the J-dimensional excess returns vector P whose representative element is E (x j ) − π j π 0 -the difference between the return on an investment of π j in asset j (E (x j )) and the return on an investment of π j in the riskless asset (
As is traditional in the international trade literature (see Dixit and Norman (1980) ). we characterize country-level demand for assets in terms of global and autarky prices. The autarky price is the price that would prevail in the absence of any international trade. We denote the autarky prices for the risky and riskless assets π g 0 and π g respectively and the autarky excess return vector P g . We also follow the international trade literature in referring to our formulations of national demand for assets as "laws of comparative advantage." Intuitively, a country has comparative advantage in a particular asset and exports that asset if the autarky price is low relative to the world price.
Proposition 1 (Law of comparative advantage for risky assets) Household demand for risky assets equals:
Risky asset demand for country g is:
The autarky equilibrium price is
equilibrium price is π = π 0 E (x) − Aβ and P = Aβ.
Proof:
The first order conditions for the household optimization problem are:
where equation (4) from the definition of covariance and Stein's lemma. Divide equation (4) by equation (3) and note that −
= A h to get:
Substituting in the period-one budget constraint yields equation (1) . To solve for prices, average equation (5) across all traders and use the fact that in autarky,c
and that in global equilibrium,c 1 =ỹ 1 . To get equation (2), average equation (1) across h ∈ g and use the fact that
What generates a high or low autarky price of asset j and thus makes a country import or export risk? Assume there is a single risky asset. Proposition 1 leads us to focus on two factors. First, all else equal, higher β g j leads to a lower autarky price for asset j. Intuitively, a high covariance of average income with the risky asset means that a country already has considerable exposure to that asset, and the marginal disutility of further exposure is high. Thus if β g j is relatively high, country g will export asset j. Second, all else equal, higher risk aversion leads to a lower autarky price for any risky asset. Higher risk aversion implies higher disutility of risk at any level of exposure.
What happens with more than one asset? If the additional asset is orthogonal to all the other assets then it is easy to see that the single asset law of comparative advantage will hold. If all assets are orthogonal (if Σ is diagonal.), then the law of comparative advantage holds in the strong sense. In general, comparative advantage holds in a weaker sense. Specifically, equation (2) implies that:
Equation (6) does not imply that the law of comparative advantage holds asset-byasset or even that there is a correlation between the excess return differentials and holdings. However, in the literature, this is typically interpreted as a "tendency" (see Svensson (1988) .) So we interpret equation (6) to say countries with high autarky prices of a given risky asset tend to import that asset. Now we consider the balance of trade in the riskless asset.
Proposition 2 (Law of comparative advantage for the riskless asset) Riskless asset demand for country g is:
Effect of risky assets on mean
Effect of risky assets on variance
4 Solve for (P − P g ). Then equation (2) implies that
Since Σ is positive semi-definite, this must be positive.
and
Proof: Becausex j and c h 1 are normal, the first order condition for the riskless asset (equation (3) equals
which implies that:
Summing equation (9) across h ∈ g and using the household budget constraints and the autarky equilibrium condition that y
Substituting the household budget constraint into equation (9) gives country-level demand:
which implies equation (7) as shown What can we say about the trade balance in the riskless asset? Unlike Proposition 1, Proposition 2 does not yield an immediate prediction on the direction of trade. However, using the budget constraint and household portfolio demand from Proposition 1, and the fact that
Sincex must be orthogonal toỹ (10) implies that:
Equation (11) implies that:
Equation (12) implies that both terms (1) and (2) in equation (7) are proportional to the demand for risky assets. Therefore, we can analyze the demand for the riskless asset conditional on some given level of demand for the risky assets: first, if ω g = 0, then a country imports the riskless asset if the autarky price of the riskless asset exceeds the world price; second, conditional on a given ω g , a country will import more of the riskless asset the higher the autarky price. What determines the autarky price of the riskless asset? Four things: (1) higher expected income growth leads to a lower autarky price; (2) a higher subjective discount factor leads to a higher autarky price; (3) the effect of absolute risk aversion is ambiguous. If the terms inside the brackets sum to a positive (negative) number, higher absolute risk aversion leads to a higher (lower) autarky price. However, absolute risk aversion affects the sign of the sum of the terms, further muddying interpretation; (4) higher sum of household variance of consumption, weighted by absolute risk aversion leads to a higher autarky price. Term (4) plays a central role in our analysis of the trade balance in goods, so we defer discussion to Section 4.
Trade in goods
Now we show how incomplete markets affect the balance of trade in goods. Proposition 3 below uses the laws of comparative advantage for risky and riskless assets (Propositions 1 and 2 respectively) to calculate the trade balance and the gains from trade using only absolute risk aversion and the autarky and global asset prices. We analyze Proposition 3 in two steps. First, we consider risky assets that enable countries to share risk with one-another. We do this by looking at countries with the different autarky excess returns (different P g ) but the same autarky riskless rates (same π 0,g ). Second, we examine risky assets that enable households within a country to share risk. We do this by looking at countries with the same autarky excess returns (same P g ) but different autarky riskless rates (different π 0,g ).
Proposition 3
and:
where Proof: Equation (12) implies that:
By the budget constraint and equation (16):
which yields equation (13) . The solution for T D g 1 is somewhat more involved. Under autarky, total consumption equals total income, so equation (9) implies that:
When a country trades internationally, equation (9) implies that:
Subtracting equation (17) from equation (18) and using equation (12) 
Now we solve:
−1
for any individual h. Summing across individuals, we get our solution.
Markets that enable risk sharing across countries
We now focus on countries that only differ with respect to P g , the vector of autarky excess returns on risky assets. Without loss of generality, assume that π g 0 = π 0 for all g. We can then re-write equations (13) and (14) as:
T D
We explicate these equations in three steps. First, we show three equivalent interpretations of equation (19) 
According to the first order conditions of the household optimization problem, p = A g cov (c g 1 ,x) and according to Proposition 1,
So the first interpretation of equation (19) tells us that the trade deficit increases if households change their exposure to assetx when international trade is allowed, regardless of the sign of the change.
To understand why the trade deficit is always positive when π g 0 = π 0 , we turn to our second interpretation of equation (19). If we expand the quadratic and use the equilibrium autarky pricing relation in Proposition 1 we get:
The first term in equation (21) measures the effect on national wealth of investing in an asset with an excess return different from zero -if the excess return is positive, they invest positive amounts; if it is negative, they invest negative amounts. Either way, excess returns allow a country to consume more in both periods leading to a higher trade deficit in period zero. The second term measures the hedging benefit of risky assets. If national income is positively correlated with a particular risky asset, then a country can reduce the variance of consumption which reduces the precautionary saving motive and thus increases period-zero consumption. Finally, the third term measures the cost of hedging national income risk. Households in a country can unload national income risk by shorting a risky asset correlated with it. But if the excess return on this asset is positive, such hedging will force a country to consume less in each period. Equation (19) implies that the sum of these three effects must always be positive. Finally, we exploit the fact that in international trade equilbrium p = Aβ to generate a third interpretation of equation (19). Specifically, since β = cov (ỹ 1 ,x):
where a hat (·) denotes the expectation of that variable conditional on the set of risky assets. I.e.:ŷ
Thus the trade deficit is proportional the variance of the difference between the projection of national income into the span of traded assets and the projection of world income into the span of traded assets, adjusted for risk aversion. Corollary 1 proves the above result for the multi-asset case. We now consider the trade deficit in period one. The first order condition with respect to the riskless asset implies that:
Autarky equilibrium implies that:
Subtracting equation (24) 
The trade balance grows over time if the variance of consumption in international trade exceeds the autarky variance of consumption. How does international trade in assets affect the variance of consumption? Equation (12) tells us that:
Two equivalent interpretations of equation (25) yield insights. First, equation (25) tells us that if a country uses the risky asset to increase exposure (i.e. if ω g > 0), then the variance of consumption will go up and so will the trade deficit. Similarly if a country uses the risky asset to reduce exposure (i.e. if ω g < 0) then the variance of consumption will go down and so will the trade deficit. Thus, all else equal, a country which takes a positive position in a risky asset will see an increase in its period-one trade deficit and a country which takes a negative position will see a reduction in its period-one trade deficit. So in contrast to period zero, in period one, the sign of holdings in the risky asset matter to the direction of trade in goods.
Second, we can again use our equilibrium autarky and international pricing relations to re-write equation (25):
Equation (26) implies that if the variance of the portion of world income spanned by assets exceeds the variance of the portion of national income spanned by assets, the trade deficit goes up. We can use a common statistic from regression analysis to help with our analysis here. For a household incomeỹ 
Higher R 2 g leads to lower consumption variance thus to a lower trade deficit in period one.
It is important to note that a country can run a trade deficit in period zero and and expected trade deficit in period one. How can this apparent violation of budget balance take place? Risky assets. Suppose the risky asset pays 10 percent return and the riskless asset pays only five percent. If country borrows a dollar and invests 95 cents in the risky asset, consumption exceeds income by 5 cents. And, in expectations, the risky asset pays off 0.95×1.15 = 1.094 dollars next year, which exceeds debt which is worth 1.00 × 1.05 = 1.05. Thus consumption, in expectations, exceeds income by 4.4 cents next year as well.
Corollary 1 (Small open economy) Trade deficit in period zero is increasing in:
Proof: By Proposition 1:
We now consider a simple general equilibrium example that illustrates several of the key concepts of this section. Consider two equally sized countries, a and b. (26) the trade deficits for both countries are the same in period one which implies that period-one trade must be balanced. Thus, we have shown that the two standard cases, no risky assets and complete markets imply balanced trade.
When risky financial markets are incomplete, however, trade balances arise. Proposition 1 implies that:
Thus country a goes short the risky asset and country b goes long. By Proposition 3, both countries run the same trade deficit, which implies that neither country can run a trade deficit. But as we explained above, since country a takes a long position, consumption variance and consequently consumption growth increases. Conversely, country b takes a short position which reduces consumption growth. Country a thus runs a trade deficit in period one. The fact that country a runs a trade deficit in one period and no trade surplus in the other suggests that country a is getting the better deal from international trade. But equation (15) shows that this is not the case. The gains from trade are equal for both countries. Country b gains from the reduction in the variance of consumption in period one. Country a gains from the increase in the level of consumption in period one. 
Corollary 2 (General equilibrium) Consider a world with two countries

Markets that enable risk sharing within countries
We now focus on countries for which autarky excess returns equal global excess returns. By Proposition 3, such countries do not trade risky assets internationally. But households may still trade risky assets domestically. We show in this section that the extent of such trade affects the trade balance.
Formally, we assume that P g = P. By Proposition 3,
So, if autarky prices of risky assets equal global prices, the sign and size of the trade balance in period zero depends on the autarky price of the riskless asset. Lower prices for the riskless asset lead to higher trade deficits. In Section 3, we identified four quantitities that determine the autarky price of the riskless asset: national income growth; the subjective discount factor; absolute risk aversion; and the weighted sum of the variances. We now assume that the first three are the same and, as promised, focus on the fourth. In other words, we now focus on: (11),
Multiplying by A h and summing across households yields:
Non-marketed risk
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (31) measures income risk that households cannot trade on markets -what we will call "non-marketed risk". How do differences in financial markets lead to differences in V g ? By assumption p = p g for all countries. So any differences in trade balances result from differences in non-marketed risk. Higher non-marketed risk leads to a higher price for the riskless asset and thus lower trade deficits. Corollary 3 generalizes this argument to the multiasset case and shows that the more assets that are traded in a country, the bigger a trade deficit that country will run.
Corollary 3 (Small open economy) Trade deficit in period zero is decreasing and trade deficit is period one is increasing in:
h∈g
All else equal, if the assets traded in country a are a superset of the assets traded in country b, then country a runs a bigger trade deficit.
Proof: Equation (11) implies that:
Holding P g and all else constant, Elul (1997) first showed that more assets imply a lower price for the riskless asset in this model. Our proof follows Willen (2002) . Note that the optimal portfolio holding defined in Proposition 1 are the solution the the problem:
Adding an asset weakly relaxes the constraint which reduces the price of the riskless asset and increases the trade deficit How do financial markets affect the quantity of non-marketed risk in an economy? All else equal, countries with more complete markets have less non-marketed risk. We use R 2 , as defined in equation (27), to measure market incompleteness. We can re-write equation (31):
Equation (32) identifies differences in trade balances across countries. First, all else equal, a country in which household R 2 h 's are uniformly higher will run a higher trade deficit. Second, suppose that each household has the same variance of income and the same risk aversion. Then higher average R 2 h leads to higher trade deficits. Finally, suppose that both countries are identical but in one country, available risky assets are a superset of the assets available in another country. In a regression, more regressors necessarily implies a higher R 2 . Similarly, more assets implies higher R 2 h 's. Thus, more assets, all else equal, imply higher trade deficits.
We now show that if a world is populated by just two countries then differences in market completeness across countries yields trade imbalances. Consider two countries a and b. Assume that p = p a = p b = 0 and that income growth equals zero, that
that there are the same number of households in both countries and that corresponding households have the same variance of income and that the variance of aggregate income is the same in both countries. Equation (8) implies that:
If markets are complete within countries, then var c Corollary 4 extends the above argument that countries with more complete markets run trade deficits with countries with less complete markets to the more general case where there are many risky assets and autarky excess returns do not necessarily equal zero. 
Corollary 4 (General equilibrium) Consider a world with two countries a and b. Suppose that
P a = P b , A a = A b , δ a = δ b and E (ỹ a 1 ) − y a 0 = E ỹ b 1 − y b 0 . IfT D a 0 0 ⇔ T D a 0 0 ⇔ 1 H h∈a R 2 h 1 H h∈b R 2 h .
Consider a world with two countries a and b, identical in every respect except that households the portfolio choice menu in country
Higher average R 2 implies a lower autarky price and thus a higher trade deficit. Since both countries can't run a trade deficit, the country with the higher trade deficit runs a trade deficit and the county with the lower trade deficit runs a surplus. Part 2 follows directly from Corollary 3
Conclusions
We have shown that incomplete markets can generate trade imbalances. In the conclusion, we briefly discuss some limitations of our approach, and the potential empirical relevance of the paper. Our analytical approach, a two-period exponential-normal model, has obvious limitations. As a two-period model, the model misses many interesting interactions between market incompleteness and dynamics. In particular, in a multi-period model, households can self-insure, reducing the need for risky asset markets. However, this limitation is not too costly. Households cannot self-insure permanent shocks and empirical evidences suggests that permanent shocks are significant at both the household and the aggregate level. For a treatment of this model in a dynamic context, see Davis, Nalewaik and Willen (2001) . So the two-period nature of the model is not a major drawback, but exponential utility and normal returns potentially are. For example, exponential utility and normal returns guarantee that an additional asset lowers the autarky price of the riskless asset. While this is typically true in incomplete market models, Elul (1997) shows that it is generically possible to find a new asset that arbitrarily perturbs the riskless rate in an arbitrary model without exponential utility and normal returns. Thus, we can extrapolate from Elul's work that, although the results in this paper typically hold in more general setups, we can certainly find situations where they don't.
Is the phenomenon of incomplete-market induced trade imbalances empirically relevant? The results of Section 4.2 show that countries with more complete markets run trade deficits with countries with less complete markets. One might argue that the U.S., with the most sophisticated capital markets in the world has more complete markets than any other country. Thus the fact that the U.S. also runs large trade deficits is consistent with the theory. On the other hand, the results of Section 4.1 predict that the more national income is spanned by risky assets, the smaller a country's trade deficits with the rest of the world. Research on the covariance of national income with various financial assets has only scratched the surface (see Botazzi, Pesenti and van Wincoop (1996) and Davis, Nalewaik and Willen (2001)) and thus the issue remains an open question.
